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In order for critical Western sociological theorists to enter into a reciprocal dialogue with these hetereogeneous Others who resist our normal science, we must first ourselves resist the homogenizing effects of the discipline that has become us. This will not be easy. It requires both an unlearning of our given epistemological confines, and a learning of some different methods, that is, different ritual practices of power and knowledge. This is also the case with regard to the possibilities of resisting the epistemological lures of fascism. "Stay tuned." We are today popularly informed of who we are, what we desire, and what we might possess through a mass of electronically-mediated images. And so we are lured into the fascinations of fascism (McRobbie, 1983; Sontag, 1981:73-105) . Daily exposure to images of "Dynasty," "Wheel of Fortune," and divinely-inspired invocations for random roadblocks and mandatory drug testing. Screen to screen, stadium to stadium, long lines of beautiful young men in uniforms in search of the thrill of victory; the pleasures of a perfect body and the pornographic excitement of becoming almost fully commodified, a living doll, the word made advert then flesh, the perfect model, the simulacrum. Accuracy in academia-what critical sociological practice can counter this fascinating fascist appropriation of certain violent fictions as truly the real world without end, Amen? The bombing of abortion clinics, the burning of crosses, paramilitary mens' clubs practicing in parking lots, a resurgence of the Klan, U.S. sponsored terrorism aimed at the suppression of struggles for justice in Central America and the relationship between the United States and South Africa. And from the airwaves, above it all, the televised image of an actor playing the role of a President declaring himself a Contra, advertising democracy just after "Jeopardy" and some time after Hiroshima; and how many years after Watts, after the Christmas bombing of Hanoi, or "Superbowl IV," Rambo, "Leave it to Beaver"? What difference? The specter of fascist epistemology: this is also a significant feature of the history of our present, perhaps more complexly, more subtley, more electric.
We want a way out. This is a desire for a different theoretical practice, for a method that may better disturb and counter the memory that threatens to inscribe us within the epistemological lures of fascism, within the collective re-presentations of an advanced capitalist, imperialist, heterosexist, racist, and electronically mass-mediated nation-state, bureaucratized in history and culturally anxious for popular rites of sacrificial release of some sort or of the Other. This is a desire for deconstruction.
Despite its roots in the epistemological displacements of French sociological theorizing in the years following World War I, the reflexive challenge of post-structuralism has largely been ignored by the professional discourse of sociology within the United States. While American literary critics and students of art, architecture, and the cinema have begun to grapple with issues related to the narrative structuring, fictive composition, and historical provisionality of all powerful claims to knowledge, questions regarding the artifactual nature of socially scientific knowledge have yet to disturb significantly the relative conceptual slumber of the dominant theoretical and methodological paradigms of American sociology. Because of this general lack of professional sociological engagement with the aesthetic and substantive challenges of post-structuralist thought, and because the text that follows makes use of a variety of post-structuralist thematics, we feel compelled to conclude this preface with a brief statement of what we read as some of the more radical implications of post-structuralism for the practice of sociology.
Post-structuralism advances what may be described as a historical and materially-informed surrealist conception of the relation between things and words, between artifacts and the linguistic rituals of power and knowledge. As such, post-structuralism critically displaces the epistemological groundings of both positivist and humanist varieties of American social theory. While positivists contend that sociology must "objectively" explain, predict, and control observable structures of social action, humanists argue that the discipline should instead concern itself with the meaningful interpretation of subjective social interaction. Despite S97 these apparent differences, both varieties of American theory share a fundamental commitment to a "realist" strategy of theory construction. Both view social facts as "things" independent of the historically-materialized narrational practices of the sociologist who pictures them as such. What differs is simply the locus of the realism identified by these two approaches. Whereas positivists see social facts in terms of abstract and objective structures amenable to quantified classification and measurement, humanists identify the subjective interpretive experience of sense-making individuals as a truly factual starting point for their more qualitative theoretical enclosures.
Post-structuralist theory resists the truth of both these positions. It also resists their pleasure-the pleasure of interpretively mastering either the objective or subjective "facts" of the Other. It resists the temptation to forget that its own re-presentation of facts is an essential feature of the sacrificial epistemological ritual by which any act of theorizing secures a given identity, a particularly truthful "being-in-the-world." As such, post-structuralism refuses to grant the theorist a place of (transcendental) epistemological privilege outside of the narrative or textual confines in which she or he finds a self materially and with imagination in history. This refusal, if incorporated into the practice of sociology, has significant implications for both the style and content of theoretical literature. Literature? With one final quote we end this preface, then move on to a re(w)riting of Foucault's critique of the literary structure of the criminological sciences, that is, the law-abiding theoretical productions of the normal human sciences in the world in which we find ourselves (w)riting. This is a history of the present. The pleasure of criminology is to displace the Other's unfixed pleasure into the pain of a certain victim and to master her, to keep an eye on her, to induce her to confess herself the proper subject of the law. This is what makes the criminologist content: His content, for it is he who speaks in history of a criminal justice, no longer in the name of the Father, as once before the alter, but now in the name of a law universal, abstract and beyond a reasonable doubt. Erect before the bar he sees her as grave matter to be ordered knowledgeably. His deadly nature and her laws he rights, he writes, he rites-three rights and nothing left: the rights of man, the writings of a science, and the ritual construction of an imperial order.
The pleasure of criminology is to displace the other's unfixed pleasure into the pain of a certain victim and to master her: to subject her to the rules of reason, just as he defines her, this exotic contrary fallen between the cracks. She is the criminologist's subject matter, this unreasonable savage other, dark and unruly. She is the object of his discipline and dangerous. He comes upon her at night in the city and enlightens. To master her, to reduce her to a thing he can count upon-this is the first pleasure of criminology. He says, "We need to penetrate the facts of this crime." This is the first pleasure of criminology: SADISM.
The second pleasure of criminology involves his gaze. To keep an eye upon her, to classify, count, and cut her up; to make her visible as a certain thing; to dissect that visibility into rates and measure her incidents; to map her determined figure and to analyze her probable path; to uncover everything about her and to lay her bare; to arrest her so that he may operate upon her and see what happens. This is the criminologist's principal method-to never let her escape from sight, to watch her constantly so as to know everything she is. This is the episteme of the discipline, the second pleasure of criminology. He says, "We need a positive science of the facts of this crime." This is the second pleasure of criminology: SUR VEILLANCE.
To the pleasures of mastery and positive science, sadism and surveillance, the criminologist adds a third-the truth of a normal subject, himself. For just as he sets about to master her and to keep his eye upon her, he discovers himself the proper subject of the law. In subjecting her "unruly nature" to the gaze of his law, he realizes himself. The gaze, with which he freezes her, mirrors back upon him and he finds his truth in what she's not: his normal self in relation to her, the other, the illegal alien, the outlaw. This, the truth of the normal subject, is the historical effect of criminological discipline, the material and imaginary locus of its power, its final pleasure. He says, "We need to know who's guilty and who's not." This is the third pleasure of criminology: THE TRUTH OF THE NORMAL SUBJECT, HIMSELF.
The Pleasures of Sadism: Mastering the Facts of Crime as "Things"

Sadism and the Confines of Reason
He said, "We need to penetrate the facts of this crime"-to master the nature of this thing laid bare, to make visible her laws, to reasonably ascertain her origin and to rationally calculate and predictively control her effects. She read this as a declaration of sadism; not because he bound her and beat her, but because of the ritual manner in which he rationally confined her otherness and silenced her, as an object to be worked upon, unreasonable and in need of a calculative make over. The Marquis de Sade had done the same and called it crime and here he was speaking a similar language and calling it criminology.
He Found Himself Alone and Afraid
It was the late eighteenth century. The calculative isolation of individuals competing for a wage had long since replaced the interdependent economic relations of feudalism. The commodified space of market labor had made his time a thing. Within this time he found himself alone with no nexus to others but the relation of things exchanged at the going rate, "naked self-interest ... callous cash payment" (Marx and Engels, [1848] 1968:37). And just as this commodity exchange had set him apart ruthless in self calculation, the rise of the nation-state stripped away previously collective political ties, dismembering the ritual powers of kin, the Church, the guild, the locale. And so he was transformed, appearing in his own eyes as an atomized individual, subject to law, a self-interested economic strategist, owing allegiance to none but the state and his reason. It was the late eighteenth century. This was the beginning of criminology. She took, notice of the punishments he had prepared to silence her and said, "We won't play nature to your culture" (Kruger, 1984:28) . It was too late. He had already prepared a cell for her confinement saying, "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. .... They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think" (Bentham, [1780] 1948:1).
The truth of what he said was self-evident to men such as he who forged their only knowledge of nature within that powerful order of things in which they found themselves alone and afraid. It was the late twentieth century and James Q. Wilson said, "The radical individualism of Bentham and Beccaria may be scientifically questionable but prudentially necessary" (Wilson, 1975:62) . And Chief Justice Burger said, "We must not be misled by cliches and slogans that if we abolish poverty, crime will also disappear. A far greater factor is the deterrent effect of swift and certain ... penalty" (Burger, 1981:44) .
She said, "NO!" She told him that she remembered a time when things were not fixed in this fashion (Michalowski, 1985:48 
Speaking of Truth
Criminology is a true discourse. It captures the other within its words and orders the truth she speaks. The content of her truth varies at different moments of the discipline. In the nineteenth century, the truth of her perverse or pathological pleasure displaced that which he previously saw as rational. In the 1920s her truth was seen as disorganization, but by the late 1930s she had become a dysfunction or perhaps even a positive contribution to the self-regulating machine in which she appeared a part. In the 1940s she confessed herself a bad learner, or so he said, while during the 1950s she revealed the truth of anomie as he questioned her every strain. In the 1960s she was laid bare again now the object of labeling, while in the 1970s she was viewed as an object of conflict. These truthful contents repeat herself, recycling the facts of her case into the present (Pfohl, 1985a). Despite these differences in what it sees as her truth, the structure of truthful criminological discourse, its basic episteme remains the same as its pleasure: "The pleasure that comes of exercising a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies, searches out, palpates, brings to light" (Foucault, 1980a:45) . And, in this, the criminologist finds himself the normal subject of the law, positioned over against her, the alien other, the exotic outlaw, the shadow of his truthful ignorance.
It was the late nineteenth century when he stood above the silent and fixed body of the dreaded brigand, Vilella, the object of the first positive criminological examination, and said, "Speak to me of the truth of your crime." It was just this morning that he poured over the body of the data spewing forth from the machine, silent and fixed. He demanded the same: a profile, a measured exactness, a story of the other's truth-and he found it! It was not his, but he worked over this body of evidence until it yielded a certain knowledge, a significance, a model of the other's determined unreasonableness. And in this he discovered a certain pleasure, evidence of his own self-contained normality. This is what only she, as he interpreted her, could provide. 
True Confessions
He had learned to speak the truth. He had learned that it was normal to find truth within himself and that this truth was reasonable. He had learned to see his self as the locus of truth, the locus of certainty. He had begun to see things this way as early as the thirteenth century as he found himself confessing before the fathers. They had sacramentalized this ritual just as feudalism began its decline. It was 1215. There was a Lateran Council and it said: No more trials by divine ordeal. No more trials by battle. We need a more reasonable way. He said, "We need to know who's guilty and who's not." He turned his eyes within.
It was the late middle ages. It was not the beginning of criminology but he was moving in that direction. He was increasingly becoming an individualized actor in the material order, just as he was becoming a judge of himself in the imaginary realm. He looked about him and saw signs of judgment everywhere and experienced the demand to keep a biographical ledger of his rights and wrongs. He was becoming the center of his own truth and began confessing this.
Philippe The Provisionality of Mastery You said, We need to penetrate the facts of this crime. We need to master the things in this world. You seem committed to a realist view of the things of this world. But you forgot that you mastered the text. You forgot that the "things" which appear as social facts (sui generis) are fictive effects of the powerful structuring practices by which we repeatedly embody ourselves in history. You ignored the traces of Marx, Durkheim, Nietzsche (Pfohl, 1985b).
She said, I have taken leave of this world of facts, in order to examine the transformative ritual practices which situate us here and now, at home in a world of artifacts. I am committed to a surrealist view of the things of this world, and these are nothing but the effects of domesticating drama, the timely consequences of our mode of production and reproduction.
You said, My story masters objects, objective truth, and you asked me: What is the objective truth of your story? My answer is uneasy, uncertain. My answer is that the material and definitional actualities of any "thing" are bound together in an indeterminate relation that "is" the effect of a transformative displacement of one set of social structuring practices by some other(s). From within this collusion or collision of practices arises a "true" story-the real facts of the matter, the real facts of the crime, the self-evidency of these "things." There are no truths aside from this elusive (intertextual) formation (Derrida, 1976) He asked, What if... But she interrupted him because she wanted her text to interrupt his reason. She said, My uncertain pleasure asserts the value of a reflexive analysis that understands itself as effecting a provisional knowledge, positioned by the power of its relationships to other practices. My uncertain pleasure is a power-reflexive social practice, a practice that displays, if imperfectly, the mode of its own production, its situationally-bound strategies of textual construction.
She continued, My uncertain pleasure, deconstruction, reflexivity, is not a positive or a normal science. It turns analytically upon itself, just as it acts upon its "subject," disclosing, not a determinate world of social facts, but an indeterminate production of artifacts, itself included. This is its strategic truth. It opens before me, again and again, the power-invested practices that provisionally effect the things of this world.
She said, You gazed, your eyes alight with reason, but your frame was fixed and you couldn't see the noise that you were making. Your certain pleasure is the gaze that holds a positive charge. My uncertain pleasure is the noise in which we find ourselves. She said, I labor under an ongoing complicity, under the words spoken by another she:
The aspect that interests me most is . . . the recognition, within deconstructive practice, of provisional and intractable starting points in any investigative effort; its disclosure of complicities where a will to knowledge would create oppositions; its insistence that in disclosing complicities the critic-assubject is herself complicit with the object of her critique; its emphasis upon "history" and upon the ethico-political as the "trace" of that complicity-the proof that we do not inhabit a clearly defined critical space free of such traces; and finally, the acknowledgement that its own discourse can never be adequate to its example (Spivak, 1981:262-63 ).
Renaming the Subject
You said, We need to know who's guilty and who's not. As you continued to fix your gaze on her, you deluded us into thinking that she was your problem, your pleasure. But, in reality, it was all of us, you, it was our eyes upon ourselves that fueled your desire. And you took pleasure in displaying your own normality. Your certain pleasure is the truth of the normal subject.
She said, My uncertain pleasure is another naming. My uncertain pleasure is not your normal subject, the subject certain of himself, the subject who recognizes himself when named, the interpellated subject, but the de-centered subject: the subject "at another place on the spiral: deconstructed, taken apart, shifted, without anchorage" (Barthes, 1977:168) .
You said, I know the other is de-centered, adrift in the world, anomic, disorganized, ill, angry. This is how I know she differs from me. Over and against her otherness, her difference, I know I am within the law, embraced.
She said, All you have learned is that you have learned to "work by yourself" (Althusser, 1971:181) without the benefits of theory, law, or therapy, and that the others, the "bad subjects . .. provoke intervention" (Althusser, 1971:181) . But, all theory, your theory too, is an intervention into the ritual process that produces subjectivity, that produces us. We are all of us de-centered subjects, uncertain subjects, produced as such by and in relation to imaginary, historical, material practices. There is ... no 'human essence'....
[T]here is only the play of difference, and the multiplicity of mutually conditioning contradictions" (Coward and Ellis, 1977:20).
She said, This is the pleasure of the heterogeneous and contradictory subject. This is an uncertain pleasure of an uncertain subject: a subject who knows we are interpellated-that we all respond to the hailing of our names. But this subject recognizes the provisionality of centering, the uncertainty of that seemingly certain anchorage, only produced by the rituals of taking the world within us. This is the uncertain pleasure of the subject whose truth is always inscribed in the power to know, to entrap in a name.
She said, You desired the truth of the abnormal subject, but you fixed the truth of the normal subject, yourself. Your certain pleasure is the naming of the other and yourself. My uncertain pleasure is the loss of a name, the truths of the de-centered subject.
She said, I labor under an ongoing autobiography, under the words of another she:
Autobiography can be a mourning for the perpetual loss of a name--one's proper word-thing (Spivak, 1977:24).
Into the Abyss
She falls into a dangerous abyss and yet finds pleasure in what she does. She is freed from all but the material and imaginary practices which provide her with a story of herself and the world. And this, of course, is everything. Here, she celebrates a ritual of deconstruc-tion, not as a bottomless trap of infinite regress, but as the strategic possibility for a finite reconstruction of the things of this world presented by the always contestable constellatin of the structuring practices in which we are engaged. This is the uncertain truth of deconstruction. This is the uncertain truth of the acknowledgement of the relation between power and knowledge.
She said, I labor under an ongoing power-reflexivity, under these words:
There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations .... It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time (Foucault, 1979:27; 1980b:133) .
The content of criminology: crime, the criminal, and the effects of a law that orders. Three certain pleasures: sadism, surveillance, and the truth of the normal subject.
An Epilogue: From Conflict Criminology to a Criminology That Conflicts
He had come from the criminology convention and said that the science of criminology was a science of conflict. He said that both criminals and those who define and detain them were forever locked within the confines of conflict, that each naturally struggled with the other to realize an interest that would impose itself, that would outlaw the other, just as it victoriously claimed the law its own. He informed her that such timeless conflict was a natural fact of human social existence and that, "the assumption here is that there are limits to the human capacity to include others as 'we' " (Turk, 1980:84) . He explained to her that this is what differentiates his theory of criminology from the others. His objective was, less to master the determinate characteristics of the criminal, than to explain scientifically the universal laws of the conflict that criminalizes. This notion was not unappealing to the many liberal voting members of the Criminological Society in which he found himself. Just as he, many were fascinated by the fact that the outlawed other was typically reported as of powerless origin: out-classed, out-raced, or unable to erect an adequate defense of self-interest. And so he turned his eyes to the facts of conflict, counting its structures, numbering its factors, and proposing its laws.
He explained to her that this is what differentiates his conflict theory of criminology from the others. She understood this: that the content of conflict criminology differed from the more conventional science of the causes of crime. But did it differ in its contentment? Did it differ in the fundamental pleasure which positioned the imagination of the criminologist materially in history as master of the natural facts of crime? This question disturbed her significantly. As she pursued this question she found herself losing her center; a slide into a different pleasure-the pleasure of difference; a slide into a different criminological practice-a politics of difference; a different conjuncture of power and its relation to knowledge. When she spoke to him of this disturbance and its different pleasure he had nothing to say. He had been telling her about his conflict theory of criminology, but she was speaking of a criminology that conflicts.
